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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
AccRE'l'!oN-TrrLI~ 'tO Ntw LAND.-Certain lots in Section 31 bounded on 
one side by a river and on the opposite side by a section line were slowly 
eaten away and submerged by the action of the water. By this process the 
river was carried beyond the section line into Section 30 onto the land of P. 
After a time the river again shifted and gradually restored P's land and 
built new land in Section 31 where the above mentioned lots had been. As 
against D who had acquired tax deeds to the new land in Section 31. P 
brought action to quiet title. Held, P had no rights in the new land in Sec-
tion 31. Allard v. Curran (So. Dak., 1918), 168 N. W. 761. 
P's contention was based on the theory that his land having become ri-
parian by the shifting of the river he was entitled to accretions added thereto 
as an incident of riparian ownership. There is authority for such view. 
Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292; Peuker v. Canter, 62 Kan. 363; Widdecombe 
v. Chiles, 173 Mo. 195. The contrary view is indicated by Gilbert v. Eldridge, 
47 Minn. 210; Ocean City As.fn. v. Shriver, 64 N. J. L. 550; Hempstead v. 
Lawrence, 70 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 52. In Volca1iic Oil & Gas Co. v. Chaplin, 
27 Ont. L. Rep. 34 (1912), the court after reviewing the English and Amer-
ican cases decided in favor of the view expressed in the latter group of cases. 
See 26 HARV. L. R£v. 185; 29 LAW Q. R£v. 3. Where a boundary is fixed by 
the location of a body of water the line may very well be a shifting one as 
the water recedes or encroaches, but where the boundary is a line in its very 
nature fixed and unshiftable, as a section line, wholly different considerations 
arise. The court in the principal case appreciated the disi:inction. See also 
Cook v. McClure, 58 N. Y. 437. 
ASSAUL'r AND BA'.1'1'£RY-S£r.F DEF£NSE.-In an action for assattlt and bat-
tery for damages by H against C, the plaintiff recovered judgment for $150. 
C pleaded self-defense, and asked the court to instruct the jury "that a per-
son in the lawful defense of his person does not have to wait until his antag-
onist assaulted him, but that he has the right to bring on the :fight if from 
the actions at the time it shall reasonably appear to him that his antagonist 
is about to assault him, although the person so assaulted may have had no 
unlawful intent in his actions; and you are charged that you must look at 
this from the standpoint of the person about to be assaulted." This was re-
fused. Held, properly refused. Chapman v. Hargrove (1918), - Tex. Civ. 
App. -, 204 S. W. 379. 
The court says: "To justify a defensive assault provoked by deceptive 
appearances the defendant must show not only a situation which creates a 
reasonable apprehension of danger to himself, but one for wliich the assaulted 
party is culpably responsible"; also the rule is different in civil suits from 
that in criminal prosecutions. The facts are not set forth, and no authority 
is cited for this conclusion. Moreover the conclusion seems to be in direct 
conflict with Dallas &c. R. Co. v. Pettit (1907), 47 Tex. Civ. App. 354, 105 S. 
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W. -12; Couruoisierv. Raymond (1896), 23 Colo. IIJ, 47 Pac. R. 284; Nr.w Or-
leans &c. R. Co. v. lopes (18g1), 142 U. S. 18, 12 S. Ct. 109, 35 L. Ed. 919; 
Zell v. Du1111away (19rr), 115 Md. 1, 8o Atl. R. 215. See on the subject of 
self-defense, DICEY, LAW 011 THS CONSTITUTION, 8th Ed. Note IV, pp. 48g-497. 
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-ANTI-TIPPING ST'ATUTS.-Action was brought on a 
writ of habeas. corpus to test the validity of a California statute (Laws of 
1917, ch. 172) which declared it a misdemeanor for any employer to require 
or accept from an employee, as a condition of the employment, any part of 
the tips received by such employee. Held, that the statute was unconstitu-
tional as an unwarranted interference with the right of contract. E:r parte 
Farbe (Cal., 1918), 174 Pac. 320. 
The majority of the· court were of the opinion that the statute would not 
conduce to the elimination of the: custom of tipping, which the court admitted 
was an evil whose eradication is desirable. No authority was cited except 
upon the general matter of restriction of contract. It has been held that tips 
turned over to an employer', in the mistaken belief that he demanded them, 
could be recovered by the emplo.yee. Polites v. Barlin, 149 Ky. 376; Zappas v. 
R(JUmeliote, 156 Iowa 709. Tips. may- be included as part of one's earnings, 
under the workman's compensation acts, Sloat v. Rochester Taxi Co., 163 N. 
Y. S. 91>4; Gt. Western Ry. Co. v. Helps, (H. of L.) 1918, A. C. 141. A stat-
ute of Mississippi prohibiting the acceptance of tips, and forbidding employ-
ers to. allow tippin~. was assumed to be constitutional in State v. Angelo, 
109 Miss. 624, and State v. So. Ry. Co., 112 Miss. ZJ, although the indictments 
in both cases were dismissed on other grounds. A Tennessee statute (Laws 
of 1915, ch. 185) appears. never to- have been passed on. 
CoNSTITUTIONAI. l.Aw-RA<:a-SSGB!CATION ORDINANcts.-Plaintiffs sued to 
enjoin the City of Atlanta: from carrying on criminal prosecutions under the 
city ordinance providing for race segregation. Held, injunction i;hould issue. 
Glwer v. City of Atlanta (Ga., 1918), g6 S. E. 526. 
A similar ordinance was passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 6o, and declared unconstitutionat 
For a. discussion of that decision see 16 MICH. L. Rsv. 109, and 31 HARV. L. 
~. 475. The Georgia supreme court had held the ordinance valid in Hardel$ 
v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248. In the instant case, however, it declared it-
self bound by the decision of the Supreme Court and reversed its original 
opinion. 
EguITY-]VRISDIC'tlON 'l'O CANCEL WHSRS LSGAi. DSFSNS!t E."<ISTS.-A con-
tract for advertising services for twelve months was superseded by another 
contract for sixty months, which was procured through. misrepresentation 
that the term was. only: twelve months. In a suit to reform or cancel the 
second contract, held. that equity has jurisdiction although the defense of 
fraud could be made- at law. Smit•Atuten1u1hl Co. v. Jersey Railwa.ys Ad-
tlerftsmg Co. (N. J. Ch., 1918), 103 Atl..388. 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS 97 
Cancellation, except where there is some independent ground of equitable 
jurisdiction, must rest upon the quia timet principle. Theoretically if an in-
strument makes a prima facie case against the complainant, the fact that he 
has a legal defence does not oust the jurisdiction of equity; for the legal 
defence may become seriously prejudiced or even dissipated before he has 
opportunity to present it. Hence it is commonly recognized that the exist-
ence of a legal defence is not a bar to suit in equity . Bu~ton v Broadway, 
45 Conn. 540; Fuller v. Percival, 126 Mass. 381; Metler v. Metler, 18 N. J. 
Eq. 270, 19 N. J. Eq. 457. The courts of New York have taken a different 
position. If a legal defence exists the complainant is told that he has ade-
quate protection through perpetuating the testimony of his witnesses. Aller-
ton v. Belden, 49 N. Y. 373. Perpetuation of testimony, however is but a 
poor substitute for the actual witness and is unavailable if the witness re-
mains in the jurisdiction. Yet it is common experience that witnesses for-
get. The undesirability of allowing the holder of an instrument to delay liti-
gation and vex the maker at a remote period was recognized in McHenry v. 
Hazard, 45 N. Y. 580, but in Fowler v. Palmer, 62 N. Y. 533, the doctrine 
of Allert01i v. Belde1i was reaffirmed and it is still followed in New York. 
Den11in v. Powers, g6 Misc. 252. The principal case is sound on principle 
and finds general support in authority. 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-NEGATrn CoNTRACT-!NJUNC'tION.-S. entered in-
to a written contract with the complainant, to serve it as editorial writer and 
have charge of the editorial page of the New York Tribu11e for four years. 
As part of his undertaking S. covenanted that he would not "write for or 
contribute to any other publication or periodical" during the term of the 
agreement. S. broke his contract and entered into an agreement with the 
McClure Syndicate for a series of articles. Complainant brought suit for 
an i11junction. Backes, V. C., granted an injunction restraining S. from 
writing for any paper other than the New York Tribune. Tribune Associa-
ticn v. Simonds, et al. (N. J. Ch., 1918), 104 Atl. 386. 
Mr. Frank H. Simonds, editorial ~riter for the New York Tribune and 
defendant in the principal case, has at last achieved distinction by breach of 
contract. He now belongs to the noble company of which Napoleon La-
joie, Annette Kellerman, and Mlle. Wagner (of blessed memory) are the 
bright particular stars. The seal of judicial approval is placed upon his 
unique quality. There is no other writer upon the war who can replace him, 
and damages however weighty can not compensate his employer. Thus 
Backes, V. C. It is true that the Vice-chancellor did not accept without 
qualification counsel's extravagant appraisal of Mr. Simonds, when in one 
ecstatic moment he said, "The loss to the world of Mr. Simonds's articles 
would be equal to that of the Huns entering Paris." But Mr. Simonds is 
unique, extraordinary, irreplacable, sui generis. His road to judicial fame 
was short if rugged. Though his first effort to obtain recognition in the 
courts was coldly received (Kennerly v. Simonds, 247 Fed. 822, 16 MICH. L. 
~v. 647), he was not discouraged. Perseverance brings its own reward. 
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E:ugit monumentllm aere perennius. For with the fall of brass in Berlin, 
who shall say that the New Jersey chancery reports will not outwear the 
most solemn "monument"? 
STATE JURISDICTION OVER SOLDn;RS.-Defendant, regularly enlisted, and 
acting as a dispatch driver, in the United States Naval Reserves, stationed 
at Newport, the headquarters of the second naval district, was arrested for 
exceeding the statutory speed limit of motor vehicles, in delivering a dispatch, 
under specific instructions of his superior officer to proceed with all possible 
dispatch, in an urgent matter pertaining to the conduct of the war between 
tlfe United States and Germany; the naval forces stationed there were in 
control of the adjoining waters, and were charged with guarding the coasts 
from possible attacks. The lower state court certified the question of lia-
bility to the Supreme Court which held, Defendant not liable. State v. Bur-
ton (1918), - R. I.-, 103 Atl. R. 9(52. 
The court says the conduct of the war rests wholly in the Federal Govern-
ment. Any state law interfering therewith, or with the officers charged with 
prosecuting the war, is suspended for the time being. The plans of the naval 
authorities for the furtherance of that purpose cannot be obstructed by the 
enforcement of such state regulations. Federal officers cannot be prevented 
from performing their lawful duties by state laws or courts, without right to 
relief by the Federal Courts, since the Federal laws are paramount. Cohensv. 
Virginia (1821) 6 Wheat 264; Tennessee v. Davis (1879), 100 U. S. 257; 
In re Neagle (1889), 135 U. S. I. Those in the military and naval service of 
the United States, while in the lawful performance of their duties are within 
this rule. United States v. Clark (1887), 31 Fed. 710; In re Fair (1900), 100 
Fed. 149; Ex parte Schlaffer (1907), 154 Fed. 921; fore Walzer (1916), 235 
Fed. 362, Ann. Cas. 1917 A-274- On the other hand an officer or soldier is 
not exempt from civil or criminal liability just because he is such officer, nor 
under a claim of performance of duty, if that is a mere subterfuge to evade 
liability. In re Waite (1897), 81 Fed. 359, 370. In time of peace the Fed-
eral Courts will not interfere with the prosecution of persons in the military 
service, in the State courts, for violation of State laws, unless they are at the 
time engaged in the actual performance of their duties as soldiers. United 
States v. Lewis (1906), 200 U. S. l, 26 S. C. 229; but compare, E~ Parle, 
Bright (1874), 1 Utah 145· In England, the military is strictly subordinate 
to the civil power, and an officer, or a soldier under command of an officer, 
acts strictly at his peril, and is liable for the violation of the law,-"be hanged 
if he obeys, and be shot if he does not obey," if he violates the civil laws. 
DICEY. LAW oF THE CONSTITUTION, 8th Ed., pp. 297-302; notes pp. 512, 538; 
BATY & MoRGAN, WiUt, ITS CONDUCT & RESULTS, p. 147 et seq. In this coun-
try there is conflict among recent opinions. See Commonwealth v. Shortall 
(1903), 2o6 Pa. St. 165, g8 Am. St. R. 759, 65 L. R. A. 193. and Franks v. 
Smith (19n). 142 Ky. 232, Ann. Cas. 1912 D-319. See Notes Ann. Cas. 1917 
C, pp. 9-27; L. R. A. 1917, B-702. 
